Volume 25
Issue 3 Symposium on International Resources Law
Summer 1985

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff a New Slant on Social
Legislation: Taking from the Rich to Give to the Well-to-DO
Susan Lourne

Recommended Citation
Susan Lourne, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff a New Slant on Social Legislation: Taking from the Rich
to Give to the Well-to-DO, 25 Nat. Resources J. 773 (1985).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol25/iss3/10

This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository.
For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY V MIDKIFF
A NEW SLANT ON SOCIAL LEGISLATION:
TAKING FROM THE RICH TO GIVE TO THE
WELL-TO-DO
EMINENT DOMAIN-PUBLIC USE CLAUSE-The United States
Supreme Court holds that Hawaii's use of eminent domain to redistribute fee simple titles among its citizens as the means to reduce
oligopolistic control of the State's land market is a constitutionally
valid exercise of state police power. Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, -

U.S.

-,

104 S. Ct. 2321, 52 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1984).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Act
The Hawaiian Legislature passed the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967
(the Act)' in an attempt to alleviate what it had identified as economic
and social hardships caused by an oligopoly in the State's residential land
market. 2 The Act sets out the circumstances under which the State may
condemn residential lots presently leased to homeowners and transfer the
fee simple titles to the lessees.
In Section 516-33(a) of the Act, the Legislature asserted, among other
things, that: 1) most of the State's private land is held by a small number
of parties who refuse to sell their lands, choosing instead to lease them
under long-term leases; 2) because of the concentration of land ownership
and the persistent practice of leasing, the State's residential land market
is "artificially inflated" and subject to a chronic shortage of fee simple
titles available for sale; 3) inflation in the residential land market contributes to economy-wide inflation in the State, thereby ultimately and
adversely affecting all Hawaiians; 4) the pervasive practice of leasing
deprives homeowners of the choice whether to own or lease the land on
which their homes are built; and 5) lessees are often forced to lease on
financially unfavorable terms and are generally restricted in their freedom
to enjoy the land.' Most broadly stated, the Legislature found that:
1. HAWAII REV. STAT. §516 et. seq. (1976) (Supp. 1983).
2. "Oligopoly" means few sellers or a shared monopoly. The antitrust problem presented by an
oligopoly in a private market is essentially that "where relatively few firms control the market, they
may recognize their 'interdependence' with the result that each may restrict his output in order to
charge a near-monopoly price." PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTI-TRusT ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES,
270 (3rd ed. 1981). See also Kemper, The Antitrust Laws andLand: An Answer to Hawaii'sHousing
Crisis?, 8 HAWAII B. J. 5 (Apr. 1971), 7-9, for a general discussion of ownership concentration in
Hawaii's land market and its effects on land and land-related prices in the State.
3. Section 516-83(a) consists of 13 paragraphs detailing the findings of the Legislature and the
public purposes to be served by the Act. Additional findings and declarations are set out in 1975
Hawaii Sess. Laws, ch. 184, § I.
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The economy of the State and the public interest, health, welfare,
security and happiness of the people .. .are adversely affected by

such shortage of fee simple residential titles and such artificial inflation of residential land values and by such deprivation

. . .

of the

choice to own or take a lease.

By tagging the evil addressed as "artificial inflation," the Legislature
implies that prices are higher than those which would exist in a healthy
competitive market taking generalized inflation into account; i.e., higher
than "natural" prices. It thereby also suggests that the current fee owners
have some power to control the market price of land, either by design
or as the inevitable consequence of concentrated ownership.'
The Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) is the administrative agency in
charge of implementing the terms of the Act. The terms provide that
tenants on single-family residential lots6 in development tracts7 may file
applications requesting that HHA condemn the lots on which their homes
sit.8 If 25 eligible tenants 9 or those on 50 percent of the lots in a tract,
whichever is less, make proper application, then HHA may hold a public
hearing to determine whether acquisition of all or some of the lots would
serve the purposes of the Act. 'oIf HHA finds that those purposes would
be served, then it may acquire the landowner's fee simple title at prices
set by condemnation trial or through negotiations between the owners
and lessees." HHA may then sell the lots to applying tenants. No single
tenant or family can acquire more than one lot.' 2 The Act contains no
prohibition against subsequent leasing of lots.
4. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 516-83(a)(4) (1976).
5. "When one or two individuals or entities own all of the land in an area capable of development,
. . .price is subject to some negotiation, but, ultimately, the bargaining cards are all in the hands
of the property owners, and it soon becomes a take it or leave it situation. When most of the
developed areas are owned by a few, then the developer really has no choice but to pass the high
price on to purchasers.
"[W]idespread leasehold tenure has aggravated the price structure in the state. First, it maintains
concentration of ownership and control, and it drives up the price of available fee land. The value
of fee land then becomes inflated, which in turn inflates the value of leased land.
Kemper,

supra note 2 at 8.
6. A "residential lot" is defined as "a parcel of land, two acres or less in size, which is used or
occupied or is developed, devoted, intended, or permitted to be used or occupied as a principal
place of residence for one or two families." HAWAII REV. STAT. § 516-1-(11) (Supp. 1983). The
definition was amended in 1980 to include two-family residences.
7. A "development tract" is defined as "a single contiguous area of real property not less than
five acres in size which has been developed and subdivided into residential lots." HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 516-2(2) (1976).
8. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 516-22 (1976).
9. Eligible tenants must, among other things, be 18 years of age, own the house sitting on the
lot, be or have a bona fide intent to be a resident of the State, show proof of his or her ability to
pay for a fee simple interest in the lot, and not own residential land elsewhere nearby. HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 516-33 (Supp. 1983).
10. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 516-22 (1976).
11. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 516-56 (Supp. 1983).
12. HAWAII REVV. STAT. § 516-28 (1976).
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Diligent implementation of the Act could result in a continuous transfer
of fee simple titles from lessors to lessees. That process would undermine
any oligopolistic power in the State's residential land market and satisfy
some portion of public demand for fee simple titles. Theoretically, as the
large landowners lose control over the market, land prices will seek more
competitive levels, thereby lessening both market-specific and generalized
inflation in the State.
The Suit
In April 1977, HHA began proceedings to condemn tracts of land held
by the Trustees of the Estate of Bernice Pauahi Bishop (the Bishop Estate),
one of the larger private landowners in Hawaii. In February 1979, the
Bishop Estate filed suit against the Commissioners and Executive Director
of HHA and HHA itself. The case was originally filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Hawaii as Midkiff v. Tom (Midkiff I)," and later
appealed to the Ninth Circuit under the same style (Midkiff II)." The
Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court decision, and the case was then
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court under the title Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff (HHA). 5 The suit sought a declaration that the Act
was unconstitutional and a corresponding injunction. 6
The primary issue addressed in the three court opinions resulting from
the Midkiff suit was whether the Act violates the public use clause of the
Fifth Amendment, applied to the states through the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Bishop Estate's challenge was that
the Act allows the State of Hawaii to use its eminent domain power to
take private property without a justifying public purpose for the taking
or subsequent public use of the property taken. In Midkiff I, the District
Court held that the Act met the constitutional requirements of the public
use clause. Its holding was based on the dual conclusions that the purposes
of the Act were within the ambit of the State's police powers and the
means chosen by the Legislature to accomplish its ends were neither
arbitrary, capricious, nor in bad faith. The Ninth Circuit majority opinion
applied a relatively narrow reading of the relevant case law and concluded
that the Act contemplated a public taking for private use in violation of
the public use clause.
Two issues were addressed by the Supreme Court on appeal: 1) whether
the Act violates the public use clause; and 2) whether the District Court
abused its discretion by not abstaining from exercising its jurisdiction
13. 483 F. Supp. 62 (D. Hawaii 1979).
14. 702 F2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983).
15. U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984).
16. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction in May of 1979 which held that the
mandatory arbitration and compensation provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. 471 F. Supp.
871 (D. Hawaii 1979).
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over the Midkiff case. The Supreme Court held that the District Court
had not abused its discretion under either the Pullman- or Younger-abstention doctrines. 7 The Court noted particularly that Pullman-abstention
was inappropriate because -there was no uncertain question of state law
at issue. The Act "unambiguously provides that 'the use of the power
• ..to condemn ...is for a public use and purpose.""' The Supreme
Court overruled the Ninth Circuit majority decision on the Fourteenth
Amendment challenge. It based its holding on the breadth of the states'
police powers and the degree of deference courts, particularly the federal
courts, should give a legislative determination that a public taking will
result in a public use.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In HHA, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he people of Hawaii have
attempted, much as the settlers of the original 13 Colonies did, to reduce
the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly traceable to
their monarchs." 9 In order to fully appreciate the truth of that statementor its irony, depending on one's viewpoint-some understanding of the
history of land ownership in Hawaii is necessary.
The TraditionalLand Tenure System in Hawaii
Archeological evidence tentatively indicates that Hawaii was settled
by peoples from the Marquesas and Society Islands as early as the eighth
century, and by peoples from Tahiti during the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. From the thirteenth century until the arrival of Captain James
Cook in 1778, the Hawaiians were apparently isolated from the rest of
the world.2
Under its traditional land tenure system, Hawaii was divided into various kingdoms. By virtue of conquest, each king had paramount power
over the land within his realm. The kings chose their own lands and
allotted the remaining lands to their warrior chiefs. The chiefs, in turn,
chose their lands and reallotted the rest to their own supporters, and so
on down to the common tenants. Any allotment of land was ultimately
at the sufferance and subject to the continued power of the allottor. Though
not a common practice, tenants could be dispossessed at will.2 Tenants
were free to move among land divisions and from the governance of one
chief to that of another.22
17. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971).
18. 104 S. Ct. at 2327 §516-83(a)(12) (1977).
19. 104 S. Ct. at 2323.
20. GAVAN DAWS, SHOAL OF TIME, xii-xiii (1963).
21. JON J. CHINEN, THE GREAT MAHELE: HAWAII'S LAND DIVISION OF 1848 5 (1958).
22. Id. at 6.
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The islands were also divided into named districts23 which were subdivided into ahupua'a subject to the supervision of a land manager, or
konohiki.24 Ideally, an ahupua'a "stretched in a wedge from its apex at
a mountain top to its base in the sea," thereby embracing the widest
range of an island's resources.25
In the very early 1800s, King Kamehameha I unified the islands under
his control.26 By the mid-1820s when Kamehameha III took the throne,
a large foreign population already existed in Hawaii. 27 Although the individual interests of the foreign population may have differed on a number
of other points, the traditional land tenure system in Hawaii was repugnant
to all. The threat of dispossession became particularly disconcerting to
the foreign population as its capital investment in Hawaiian agricultural
enterprises increased during the 1830s and 1840s. 2"

An Era of Land Reform
Using their political and religious influence, backed by economic and
military muscle, the foreign population in Hawaii eventually persuaded
King Kamehameha III and other native leaders that Hawaii's traditional
political system, including its land tenure system, was no longer viable. 29
The King's first step toward political reform was to enact the Bill of
Rights of 1839. That Bill provided that protection of law would be given
to persons, their building lots, and property, and that a "landlord cannot
causelessly dispossess his tenant." 3° In 1840, Kamehameha III granted
the Hawaiian kingdom its first constitution, by which the government
changed from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy.3 1 An act passed
in 1845 established a Board of Commissioners to Quiet Titles with power
to investigate and confirm or reject existing claims to property rights in
23. In 1848, the Island of Oahu was divided into six districts, one of which has been renamed
"Honolulu." The districts (mokus), or their geographic successors are important today as judicial
districts. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. Roger C. Green, Makaha Before 1880 A.D., 31 PACiFC ANTHROPoLoGICAL RECORDS 5 (Dept.
of Anthropology, Bernice Pauahi Bishop Museum, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 1980). Although divisions
were often made according to prominent natural features, boundaries were also often elusive. Certain
people were taught how to remember division boundaries and that information was passed on from
one generation to the next. CHINEN, supra note 21, at 1.
26. CHINEN, supra note 21, at 6.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., DAws, supra note 20, at 61-125, and CHINEN, supra note 21, at 7.
29. "The vigorous actions of the foreigners in the Islands, often supported by the commanders
of the warships of their homelands visiting at the time in Hawaiian waters, forced Kamehameha III
and his chiefs to review their national policy." CHINEN, supra note 21, at 7.
30. CHINEN, supra note 21, at 7; see also In re Matters of Estate of His Majesty Kamehameha
IV, 2 Hawaii' 715 (1864).
31. Id.
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land.3 2 The Board identified the nature of a claimed title as either a fee
simple or a leasehold.33
In 1848, Kamehameha III initiated a program which has come to be
known as the "Great Mahele," or land division. During the Mahele,
approximately 1,500,000 acres of Hawaii's land were conveyed by the
King to the chiefs and konohikis, and about 30,000 acres as kuleanas34
to native tenants.35 The King divided his reserved lands into two types,
setting aside about 1,500,000 acres as government lands and something
under 1,000,000 acres as Crown lands.36 The government, or public,
lands were established by an instrument in which the King conveyed all
his "rights, title and interest" in the lands described in the deed to "the
chiefs and people of [his] Kingdom." 37 The Crown lands were reserved
as the exclusive property of the King, his heirs and successors, forever.3"
The King's separate treatment of the Crown lands reflected both a desire
to exercise complete control over the land and a deep concern over "the
hostile activities of foreigners in the Islands." 39 The King did not want
the Crown lands to become part of a "public domain and subject to
confiscation by a foreign power in the event of a conquest." 4" When the
monarchy ended in 1893, the remaining Crown lands were merged with
the government lands creating a valuable public domain which later passed
from the Republic to the Territory of Hawaii.4 1
By 1841, foreigners already held "good, doubtful and squatter claims"
to land in the islands.42 That year, the national legislature attempted to
curb the increase of foreign land holdings in the Kingdom by requiring
foreigners whose claims were not supported by written titles or leases to
32'. 1846 Hawaii Sess. Laws, p. 107; re-enacted as An Act to Organize the Executive Department
of the Hawaiian Islands, art. IV (1846). CHINEN, supra note 21, at 8, n.1.
33. "[Tihere are but three classes of persons having vested rights in the land, 1st, the government
(the king), 2nd, the landlord (the chief and konohiki), and 3rd, the tenant." CHINEN, supra note 21,
at 9, quoting Preface to Principles Adopted by the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles in
Their Adjudication of Claims Presented to Them, 1846; 2 Rev. Laws of Hawaii 2120-2152 (1925).
34. "Kuleanas" were the lands awarded to the native tenants under an act of 1850. CHINEN,
supra note 21, at 30. "The kuleana was the functional unit in soil cultivation, corresponding to the
peasant's holding in Europe, as the ahupuaa corresponds to the large estate of nobility, and the ili
to a small estate .... THEODORE MORGAN, HAWAII: A CENTURY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 21 (1948).
35. CHiNEN, supra note 21, at 31.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 25. The instrument was recorded in The Mahele Book, Office of the Commissioner of
Public Lands, Territorial Office Building, Honolulu. Id. at 33.
38. id. at 25.
39. Id. See also, 4 Privy Council Records 250-308; In re Matters of Estate of His Majesty
Kamehameha IV, 2 Hawaii 715 (1864).
40. CHINEN, supra note 21, at 25.
41. Id. at 27. Before January 3, 1865 when an act was passed which made the Crown lands
inalienable (1864 Hawaii Sess. Laws, p. 69), "King Kamehameha III and his successors did as they
pleased with the Crown lands, selling, leasing and mortgaging them at will." Id.
42. MORGAN, supra note 33, at 129.
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negotiate leases with the Hawaiian governors. The leases were to be for
a fixed term, not to exceed 50 years. 43 The Hawaiian government, however, was not strong enough to stem the tide of foreign power in the
Kingdom." In 1850 legislation was passed that allowed foreigners to hold
and convey fee simple titles to Island land.45
From the Mahele to the Act
Plantation agriculture was introduced to the Islands as early as the
46
1820s. By 1876, the sugar industry dominated the Islands' economy.
The kuleanas quickly passed to foreign sugar and rice plantation owners
and land speculators. The loss of land by the native tenants has been
attributed to a number of factors, including native alienation from the
concepts of private property and "booming land prices, giving a dazzingly
large return for a lease or sale. ,,47 A similar fate befell the Konohiki lands.
Plantations also purchased and leased government lands.
Many of the largest plantation owners in Hawaii were North Americans
who maintained close economic ties with the United States and whose
interests would be served by annexation of Hawaii to the United States.
Agitation for annexation reached a climax in the revolution of January
1893. Under extreme pressure, including that exerted by an informal U.S.
military presence in the Islands, Queen Liliuokalani yielded her authority
"until such time as the Government of the United States should, ...
undo the action of its representatives and reinstate her 'as the constitutional
sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands." 49 The Queen's action had the political effect of an absolute and final abdication. A short-lived Hawaiian
Republic soon after became the Territory of Hawaii.
Between the turn of the century and World War II, Hawaii's primary
enterprises were the production and export of sugar and pineapples. During that era, "[a] tightly knit corporate and family structure dominated
the Islands' plantations, financial institutions, shipping and a substantial
portion of their wholesale and retail commerce. "5o That "structure" was
predominately controlled by North Americans. At least one source has
suggested that "[c]oncentration of land ownership both caused and reflected the unified outlook and objectives of this oligarchic regime." 5 '
43. Id. Announcement in the Polynesian, June 1841. Id. at n.28.
44. Id. at 129.
45. Id. at 136.
46. Id. at 173-185.
47. Id.at 137.
48. CHINEN, supra note 21, at 27. The government lands were sold "as a means of obtaining
revenue to meet the increasing costs of the Government." Id.
49. MERGE TATE, HAWAH: RECIPROCITY OR ANNEXATION 236 (1968).
50. HORWrrZ & MELLER, LAND AND POLMCS IN HAWAII 3 (1963).
51. Id. at 4.
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A good share of Hawaii's former Crown lands had ended up in various
royal estates and trusts. In 1884, Princess Bernice Puauhi Bishop, heir
to the estates of the Kamehamehas, died, leaving approximately oneninth of Hawaii's land in trust. Her will provided that income from her
estate be used to found two schools, one for girls and one for boys, to
be called the Kamehameha Schools. The schools were to give preference
to students of native Hawaiian ancestry.5 2 A part of the lands subject to
her estate was at issue in HHA.
Hawaii became the 50th state in August 1959. As part of his gubernatorial campaign of 1959, Governor Quinn proposed to institute a land
redistribution program which he tagged the "Second Mahele."53 The
proposal was debated in the 1961 legislative session where the issue of
State land law was generally explosive. Governor Quinn's plan proposed
to offer about 145,000 acres of State lands for public sale. The lands
were claimed to be on all the major islands and to include a complete
cross-section of all types of island terrain. The plan called for dividing
the land into blocs for subdivision into smaller lots to be sold on a oneto-a-family basis."
Quinn's proposal was severely criticized on grounds including that the
bulk of lands to be distributed were already under lease to sugar plantations
and ranches, and that the proposal would destroy the agricultural industry.55 The Second Mahele was blocked in both the House and Senate,
but the legislative debates attending and following its demise were fierce
and described
the State's land problems in terms of monopoly and short56
age.
Concentration and Inflation in Hawaii's Land Market Circa 1967
Immediately prior to adoption of the Act, 72 private parties owned
about 47 percent of the land in Hawaii; 18 of them holding nearly 80
percent of the privately owned fee simple land in the State.57 The State
and federal governments combined claimed to control about 48.5 percent,
but that figure was high because both claimed some of the same land. 58
The tracts at issue in HHA are situated on the Island of Oahu where high
ownership concentration may be particularly critical. The island supports
52.
53.
54.
duced
55.
56.
57.

DAWS, supra note 20, at 299.
HoRwrrz, supra note 50, at 2.
Governor Quinn's proposal was set out in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, July 23, 1959, reproin HORWITZ, supra note 50, at 5.
HORwrrz, supra note 50, at 5.
Id. at 6-10.
Conahan, Hawaii's Land Reform Act: Is It Constitutional?, 6 HAWAII B. J. 31,33 (Jul. 1969),

citing LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF HAWAII, PUBLIC POLICY IN HAWAII: MAJOR

LANDOWNERS 13 (Report No. 3, 1967).
58. Id.
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both plantation agriculture and dense urban development, including the
City of Honolulu. In 1967, the federal government was the largest landowner on Oahu and held about 36.7 percent of the land.5 9 The Bishop
Estate was the second largest landowner, controlling about 15.5 percent
of Oahu's land.6 Twenty other private parties owned about 41.5 percent
of the land on the island. 6'
In 1970, the selling prices for new homes in Hawaii were almost 60
percent above national figures and those for existing homes about 90
percent higher.62 The market value of the home site in Hawaii made up
more than 40 percent of the total property value; the national average
was closer to 20 percent.63 Between 1960 and 1969, land costs increased
by 73.2 percent for new homes and by 94 percent for existing homes.
Between 1952 and 1970, land costs had risen 225 percent. 64
Hawaii is subject to a number of forces besides a high concentration
of ownership which contribute to the situation reflected in these statistics.
By 1967, land prices in the Islands had been notoriously high for almost
100 years. A fair portion of Hawaii's land is unusable for any purpose.
By 1860, nearly nine-tenths of the available land had already been taken
up. 65 A higher population growth than the national average also increases
demand relative to other parts of the country, exacerbates existing land
shortages, and puts constant upward pressure on land prices. Also, an
excellent return on agricultural land keeps a high floor on land prices in
the State. 66
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The federal sovereign power of eminent domain is limited by the Fifth
Amendment mandate that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall property be taken for
public use without just compensation." Through the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, that mandate also restricts the eminent
domain power of the states.6 7 Courts have construed the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments as establishing three guarantees to persons whose
59. Id. Federal land on Oahu is largely set aside for military purposes and not likely to be
relinquished to ease local private land shortages. The State of Hawaii owned about 14.9% of the
land, but claimed that it had little to make available to residential buyers because of a need for
parks, schools and other public facilities. Id. at 33-34.
60. Id. at 33, n.5.
61. Id. at 33.
62. Kemper, supra note 2, at 5.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 6.
65. MORGAN, supra note 33, at 135.
66. See generally, Kemper, supra note 2, at 7.
67. See e.g, Chicago Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 266 (1897).
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property may be taken by a sovereign for its own use: 1) that the mechanism by which a taking is consummated will comport with due process;68
2) that the person from whom property is taken will receive just compensation;69 and 3) that the property taken will be put to public use. For
purposes of this discussion, the third guarantee will be broken down into
two elements: that property will be taken for a public purpose and that
it will be used in some sense by the public.
Public Purposes and the Police Power
Public purposes define the ends sought by a lawmaking body. If the
public purposes stated by a legislature are found by the Court to be within
the scope of the police power, then the use of eminent domain to achieve
those purposes is simply a means to an end.7" If the means is rationally
related to a constitutional objective, then the use of eminent domain will
be upheld.71
Both the District Court in Midkiff I and the Supreme Court in HHA
applied a "police power/due process" analysis to conclude that the Act
did not violate the public use clause. That analysis is based on the rationale
used by the Supreme Court in a 1954 eminent domain decision, Berman
v. Parker.72 In its discussion of the nature of the states' police power, the
Berman Court noted that "an attempt to define its reach or trace its outer
limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts." The Court
went on to say that what constitutes a state's police power is "essentially
the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of
government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition."" The Berman Court cited public health, safety, peace,
and morality as among the common issues addressed by exercises of
police power, but noted that the "concept of public welfare is broad and
inclusive," and that the "values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.""
The federal judiciary, construing the ramifications of dual sovereignty
and separation of powers, has adhered to a policy of extreme deference
68. As well as guaranteeing just compensation and that taken property will be put to public use,
due process of law protects property owners against any form of procedure in eminent domain cases
which would deprive them of an opportunity to be heard and to make whatever claims and objections
they are entitled to make. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 8 (1966).
69. When real property is taken, just compensation is generally considered to be the fair market
value of the land. See, e.g., Bigham, "FairMarket Value," "Just Compensation," and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1970).
70. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954), citing Luxton v. North River Bridge
Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529-530 (1894).
71. See, e.g., Rindge v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
72. 348 U.S. 26.
73. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
74. Id. at 32-33.
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to legislative definitions of what constitutes a valid exercise of state police
power when the exercise will not impinge on activities, persons, property,
or rights subject to the plenary jurisdiction of the federal government.7 5
In Berman, the Court stated that "[slubject to specific constitutional
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." 76 The latitude given legislatures
to define their own police power to promote the public welfare as described
in Berman suggests that what constitutes valid public purposes within the
context of an eminent domain action is fundamentally a political question
and subject to appropriately limited judicial scrutiny.
Public Use
Although the Berman decision is best known for its discussion of the
breadth of the police power, it also stated the limits on that power: the
facts of each case and "specific constitutional limitations. "" To the extent
that the public use clause protects the property rights of individuals against
collective lawmaking authority, the clause constitutes a limit on sovereign
police power. Standing alone, then, the requirement that a taking serve
a public purpose seems to beg the question of what constitutes a valid
exercise of police power within the context of a public use clause challenge.
A separate requirement that property taken be put to public use potentially introduces an issue of fact which could limit the scope of otherwise
valid public purposes. The distinction between public purposes and uses,
however, is inherently vague. Arguably, once the legislature has stated a
public purpose which may be furthered by an exercise of the state's
eminent domain power, the public "uses" the property taken to serve
that purpose. Perhaps the simplest way out of this conundrum is to assess
the extent to which the taken property is subsequently put to private,
rather than public, use. For instance, both a taking of land for military
purposes and a taking under the Hawaiian Act may serve public purposes
as defined by lawmakers. The former, however, will not result in direct
use of the land by private citizens; the latter, obviously, will. These
examples represent opposite ends of a private use spectrum. Most cases
will fall somewhere between.
In Midkiff II, the Ninth Circuit majority (Ninth Circuit) described the
fundamental constitutional limitation on sovereign eminent domain power
in terms of the republican compromise with pure democracy contemplated
75. Compare the strict scrutiny given state determinations regarding what constitutes valid exercises of state police power when those exercises will burden interstate commerce. See, e.g., Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
76. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
77. Id.
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by U.S. founding fathers.7" Its discussion suggested that a major objective
reflected in constitutional debates was that the tools of government would
not be used to redistribute private property among private parties. The
Ninth Circuit cited early case law in support of its position. In 1979, the
Supreme Court declared that " [a] law that takes property from A and
gives it to B . . . is against all reason and justice. 7 9 Similarly, an 1896
case, Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska,8 ° held that "[t]he taking by a
state of the private property of one person or corporation, without the
owner's consent, for the private use of another, is not due process of law
and is a violation of the fourteenth [amendment]."" As literal propositions, all of the above have been undermined by subsequent social legislation aimed at redistributing resources among the population and by
case law upholding the validity of such legislation.
Whether property taken through eminent domain will be put to public
use has been treated, at least in part, as a question of fact. In Midkiff II,
the Ninth Circuit set out a list of instances where federal courts had found
a public taking to be for a constitutionally acceptable public use. That
list includes instances when the taking resulted in: 1) an historically
acceptable public use;52 2) a change in the use of the land; 3) a change
in possession of the land; 4) a transfer of ownership from a private party
to a governmental entity; and 5) a de minimis condemnation necessary
to develop nearby land. 3 The Ninth Circuit noted that the Hawaiian Act
fit none of those descriptions. 84
In People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Assoc.,85 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a condemnation of over 3,000
acres of private land on the Island of Vieques. The public purposes
declared in the Land Law of Puerto Rico included ending an existing
latifundia,6 blocking its reappearance in the future, and assisting in the
creation of new landowners. 87 The land condemned was to be redistributed
78. "[In a pure democracy a] common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by
a majority of the whole; ... there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party
or an obnoxious individual ....
A republic promises ... the cure for which we are seeking ...
"
Midkiff H, 702 F.2d at 792, quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, 104-09 (J. Madison) (Hamilton ed.
1863).
79. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388 (1748).
80. 164 U.S. 403.
81. Id. at 417.
82. "Following the establishment of the United States Constitution, there were two major kinds
of activities for which the power of eminent domain was undisputedly properly employed: mill acts
and road building." Midkiff II, 702 F.2d at 794.
83. Id. at 793-794.
84. Id. at 794.
85. 156 F.2d 316 (1946).
86. A "latifundia" is a system of large landholdings. A "latifundio" is a large landed estate.
87. Puerto Rico, 156 F.2d at 318, citing 1941 P.R. Laws, p. 388 et. seq.

July 1985]

HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY v. MIDKIFF

in small parcels to individual agregados8 to build their homes on, in
larger parcels to farmers for subsistence farms, and in large parcels, by
lease, to professional agriculturalists to develop "proportional-profit"
farms. 89 The court of appeals stressed that if any of the uses set out in
the Law was found not to be public, then the petition in that case would
have been properly dismissed. It concluded, however, that the uses must
be looked at in the aggregate and in the context of a comprehensive
program of statewide agrarian reform."
At least three potentially diverse interpretations of the court of appeals'
conclusion are possible: 1) that the individual users, in the aggregate,
constituted the public; 2) that the individual uses, in the aggregate, constituted public use; or 3) that the public purposes served by the Law
rendered the individual private uses public. If the public purposes supporting a taking are viewed as rationale and severable from the issue of
the actual use to which property is put, then the third possible conclusion
listed above would not, by itself, support a public taking. That position
was taken by the Ninth Circuit in Midkiff II when it held that, stripped
of its rationale, the Act constitutes a blatant attempt by the State of Hawaii
to redistribute property among its citizens for the private use of some of
them. 9
Early case law indicates that there is a limit to the judicial deference
which should be given a legislature's public use determination. In a 1905
decision, the Court quoted an 1882 state decision for the proposition that
"[i]t is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the control of
the courts in exercising the power of eminent domain. . . .For if the use
be not public ...the legislature cannot authorize the taking of private
property against the will of the owner, notwithstanding compensation
may be required." 92 If, however, as indicated in other decisions, the
88. "Agregado" is defined in 1941 P.R. Laws § 78 as "any family head residing in the rural
zone, whose home is erected on lands belonging to another person or to a private or public entity,
and whose only means of livelihood is his labor for a wage."
89. Puerto Rico, 156 F.2d at 321.
90. "The four contemplated uses for the land enumerated above are closely inter-related. Each
use plays a part in a comprehensive program of social and economic reform. Thus we see no basis
for analyzing each proposed use separately. Instead we think the entire legislation should be regarded
Ias a single integrated effort,' to improve conditions on the island, and so viewed we think enactment
of the statutes within the power of the Insular Legislature." Id. at 323.
91. Midkiff 1I, 702 F.2d at 798. "'This court need not, and will not, stand idly by and allow
[federal] administrative officials to take private property arbitrarily, capriciously, in bad faith, or for
what is essentially a private purpose.' (emphasis added)." Id. quoting United States v. 23.9129
Acres of Land, 192 F. Supp. 101, 102 (W.D. Cal. 1961).
"When we strip away the statutory rationalizations contained in the Hawaii Land Reform Act,
we see a naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take the private property of A and
transfer it to B solely for B's private use and benefit." Midkiff Il,702 F.2d at 798.
92. Tracy v. Elizabethrtown, B. & S.R.R., 80 Ky. 259, 265 (1882).
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legislature's public use determination is to be deferred to until it is shown
to "involve an impossibility" 93 or to be "palpably without reasonable
foundation,"' then any substantive control by the courts is questionable.
If the concepts of public use and purpose are then equated without reference to private use, the protection afforded individual property rights
by the public use clause becomes extremely elusive.
THE HHA DECISION
In HHA, the Court defined the issue before it as
[w]hether the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits
the State of Hawaii from taking, with just compensation, title in real
property from lessors and transferring it to lessees in order to reduce
the concentration of ownership of fees simple in the State.95
The Court began its analysis by quoting the Berman decision to establish
the breadth of the states' police power, the degree of judicial deference
which should be given legislative definitions of public needs, and that
an exercise of eminent domain power is simply a means to an end. The
Court then concluded that "[tihe public use requirement is coterminus
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers. '"96
The Court went on to state that even when the power of eminent domain
is equated with the full scope of the police power, a role for the courts
exists in reviewing a legislature's public use determination. It described
that role as "extremely narrow," concluding that a different rule would
result in the judiciary supplanting its own judgment for that of the legislature in deciding what constitutes a valid governmental function or a
public use.97
The Court acknowledged that its previous decisions had drawn a line
at takings of one person's property for the private benefit of another,
absent a justifying public purpose. It identified the circumstances under
which such takings would be unconstitutional as those which could not
support any legitimate public purpose. The Court concluded that "where
the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, [it had] never held a compensated taking to be
proscribed by the Public Use Clause." 9 8
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Old Dominion Land Co. v. U.S., 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925).
United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896).
HHA, 104 S.Ct. at 2324.
Id.at 2329.
Id.
Id.at 2329-2330.
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Applying the theory set out above to the facts before it, the Court
concluded that it could not disapprove of Hawaii's use of its eminent
domain power in this instance because: the people of Hawaii, via the
Act, were attempting to alleviate perceived evils of a land oligopoly
"traceable to their monarchs"; the legislature had alleged that that oligopoly created "artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the
State's residential land market"; the pervasive practice of leasing deprived
thousands of the choice whether to lease or buy the land on which their
homes were built; and regulating oligopoly and its attendant evils was a
classic exercise of the State's police power."
The Court concluded that the Act constituted a "comprehensive and
rational approach to identifying and correcting market failure."" It then
noted that whether the Act would, in fact, accomplish its purposes was
not the object of judicial review; that if the public purpose is legitimate
and the means are not irrational, then "empirical debates over the wisdom
of the taking . . are not to be carried out in the federal courts. "'0 ' The
Court further concluded that if the legislature "rationally could have
believed" that the Act would promote its objectves, then the constitutional
requirement is satisfied.° 2
The Court next addressed the Ninth Circuit's decision holding the Act
unconstitutional. It first noted that the Ninth Circuit had read the relevant
case law as supporting a much narrower view than that adopted by the
Court in HHA. It then rejected the argument that a transfer of property
in the first instance to private parties would "condemn that taking as
having only a private purpose." 0 3 The Court cited precedent for the
proposition that "what in its immediate aspect is only a private transaction
may . . . be raised by its class or character to a public affair," concluding
that it is "only the taking's purpose and not its mechanics, that must pass
scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.""
The Court ended its opinion by reiterating that the public purpose
justifying the Act was "to attack certain perceived evils of concentrated
property ownership" in the State and that the State's use of eminent
domain to that end was not irrational. 0 5 Those circumstances, together
with the fact that the "weighty demand" of just compensation had been
met, satisfied the requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. "
99. Id. at 2330.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2331.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2331-2332.
106. Id. at 2332.
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ANALYSIS

A conflict between the states' police powers and the protection given
persons in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is ultimately one between
the powers of lawmakers and the rights of individuals. Considering only
the language used in recent cases deciding public use clause challenges
to an exercise of sovereign eminent domain power, the outcome in HHA
was predictable. Equally predictable was the Fourteenth Amendment challenge in that case. The inevitability of both the challenge and the outcome
suggests a possible conflict between the Court's view of its role in such
cases and public expectations regarding constitutional protection of private property. The key to this conflict may be found in the qualifying
language in Berman that any attempt to define the scope of a state's police
power "is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts."" 7
The HHA Court cited Berman in support of the proposition that the
public use requirement is coterminus with a state's police power. The
scope of a state's police power is incapable of judicial definition, largely
the product of legislative determinations of what collective actions will
serve the public interest, and broad enough to allow social legislation
serving the public welfare. After Berman, the public welfare is apparently
a metaphysical as well as mundane concept because it includes spiritual
and aesthetic values. The public welfare is the pool from which public
purposes may be drawn.
In HHA, the Court stated that it had never found a compensated taking
unconstitutional where the use of eminent domain was "rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose." As partial support for that position, the
Court quoted language from a 1925 decision stating that judicial deference
should be given a legislature's public use determination "until that determination is shown to involve an impossibility."'0 8 Arguably, two substantive conceptual changes are reflected in the HHA Court's elaboration
on the earlier precedent.
First, the 1925 case, Old Dominion Land Co. v. U.S.," 9 equated the
concepts of public use and purpose, if at all, in a manner which constitutes
a transposition of the equation drawn in HHA. The full language used to
describe the degree of deference due in that instance was that "[Congress']
decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility. But the military purposes mentioned at least may have been
entertained and they clearly constituted a public use. ""' The implication
is that if public use is established, then public purpose may be presumed.
In the more recent cases, particularly HHA, just the opposite seems to
107.
108.
109.
110.

Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
Old Dominion, 269 U.S. at 66.
269 U.S. 55.
Id. at 66.
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be the rule; i.e., if public purpose is established, then public use will be
presumed. The use to which property is put is inherently a factual issue,
whereas the validity of a public purpose appears to be purely legal. The
collapsing of the factual issue into the legal one has the effect of seriously
undermining the importance of the statement in Berman that "each case
must turn on its own facts."
The second conceptual change arising from HHA further undermines
the importance of the facts in any given case. Arguably, a test for impossibility as required by the Old Dominion language could allow a
showing of impossibility in fact. The language used by the HHA Court
requires only that a taking be supported by a conceivable public purpose.
Even allowing for the moment that the equation of public purposes and
uses is reasonable, a test for impossibility seems narrower than one for
conceivability. Conceivability has little or nothing to do with facts as they
exist in the objective world. Unless the legislature (or Congress) is particularly inarticulate and can't state a conceivable public purpose, its
determination that a public taking will serve a public purpose is, for all
practical purposes, irrebuttable. The fact that the legislature conceived
the public purpose is proof of its conceivability.
The only issue remaining, then, is whether the use of eminent domain
is rationally related to the end defined by the legislature. When "rational"
is related to "conceivable" which in turn is linked to a realm of circumstances including the metaphysical, that term becomes akin to "rationable," and, again, is hardly a matter of fact.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the State of Hawaii is essentially
alleging in the Act that the problem in the State's land market is oligopoly.
The means developed by both federal and state governments to redress
monopolistic power in private markets is the body of antitrust law. In
1962, the Hawaiian attorney general issued an opinion to the effect that
the leasing and selling of land in the State would be subject to the State's
antitrust laws."' Ironically, an antitrust suit is a very complicated, factually-oriented action. The difference between the burden of proof placed
a legupon an accusing party in an antitrust suit and that placed upon
2
staggering."1
is
power
domain
eminent
its
exercising
islature
I11. Hawaii Atty. Gen. Op. 62-39 (August 7, 1962).
112. In Midkiff 1, the plaintiffs urged the court to allow them to "show that each and every
legislative rationale for [HAWAII REV. STAT. § 516-83 (1976)] is wrong." Id. at 65. They claimed
that "if all the economic justifications for the statute are disproved, all that is left are social justifications-such as the social engineering goal of land redistribution." Id. Those social goals, contended the plaintiffs, could not alone justify the taking as being for a public use. The court disagreed,
stating that the issue before it was restricted to whether the plaintiffs had been denied substantive
due process. To satisfy substantive due process, the court had only to determine whether the legislature's means of achieving its goal was arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith. "If the Court
determines (I) that any possible rationale for the statute, expressed or not, is within the bounds of
the State's police power, and (2) that the statute is not arbitrary or the product of legislative bad
faith, then the statute is constitutional." Id.
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CONCLUSION
The two cases which are factually most similar to HHA are Berman
and the Puerto Rico case. In Berman, property was taken by Congress
for the purpose of eliminating a slum area in the District of Columbia.
The "blight" addressed in that instance could be isolated and addressed
in its entirety, at least as a physical phenomenon. Also, whether the
outcome of the redevelopment project was as expected and hoped, the
change effected was immediate and included the provision of at least
some additional or improved public facilities, such as parks and schools.
The redistribution scheme in the PuertoRico case was also comprehensive
and entailed a change in both possession and use of the land at issue. By
contast, the scheme established in the Hawaiian Act seems piecemeal and
accomplishes a change in neither use nor possession.
Although a loss of private fee simple title necessarily attends any public
taking of land, the public has traditionally used the real property taken
to accomplish its ends rather than the title to that property. In the Hawaiian
instance, the private titles themselves are used by the public while the
real property taken is used exclusively by private parties. The chain of
events and span of time between the takings contemplated by the Act and
the alleviation of, for instance, economy-wide inflation in the State is
particularly long and speculative. In the meantime, private parties enjoy
the property taken by the State while the public can be guaranteed no
benefit from the taking.
If the "artificial inflation" complained of in the Act arises from a
shortage of residential land on the Islands rather than illegal oligopolistic
collusion, then a change in ownership will only allow more parties to
enjoy the hardship imposed on others by the shortage. New owners cannot
produce more land. Also, because the Act places no prohibition on subsequent leasing of the lots taken, those private parties to whom lots are
transferred are in a position to enjoy whatever financial benefits accrue
from the practice of leasing and to impose the same restrictions on subsequent possessors as were imposed by the original owners.
The states' power of eminent domain has been treated as sacred by the
courts. Fourteenth Amendment rights have also been viewed as sacred,
though perhaps primarily by the public. Unfortunately for those to whom
the guarantee of just compensation is not terribly satisfying by itself, the
only living protection one can count on from the Fourteenth Amendment
in cases arising from an exercise of eminent domain power is that just
compensation will be paid.
SUSAN LOURNE

